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ARTICLES
The Costs and Benefits of Affordable Housing:
A Partial Solution to the Conflict of Competing Goods
Michael Diamond*
In this Article, I extend a prior inquiry into the costs borne by society due to
the lack of enough decent, affordable housing units. I previously outlined those
costs and suggested a combination of public cost savings and public and private
benefits that would accrue by providing that housing. I posited that the savings
and benefits, in the aggregate, could at least substantially offset the costs and
might even exceed them. If that is so, I queried, why has society not produced the
needed units? In answering that question, I offered several possible responses:
inadequate resources, racism, and public choice opposition.
In this Article, I examine the lack of resources in the context of what I have
called “the conflict of competing goods.” This conflict arises when there are a
variety of public goods to be obtained but insufficient resources to maximize them
all. The questions then are how does society choose among them and how ought it
do so? I attempt to answer these questions by reverting to a form of evaluation
espoused by economists and certain politicians—Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).
While I do not accept CBA as the appropriate model for many types of
evaluations, I use it here to support an argument that society should provide more
affordable housing units. I attempt to identify the costs of the absence of such
housing in relation to the benefits of providing it in an effort to enhance the other
arguments—morality, equity, etc.—that underlie my own view of the problem.
Thus, if the hypothesis is correct—that affordable housing can, essentially, pay for
itself, the conflict of competing goods can be substantially, although not entirely,
reduced.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article involves a summary of the problem, including the costs, of an
inadequate supply of decent, affordable housing. It goes on to describe the CostBenefit Analysis (CBA) methodology and to criticize its use in certain situations.
Nevertheless, I go on to propose a method for the financing and production of
significantly more affordable housing consistent with the application of CBA to
the problem. There are in our society several social needs that most people,
regardless of political affiliations, would say ought to be filled. Better healthcare,
education, and housing, for example, are among them.1 There are differences of
1. See Public Opinion Research, HOUSING TRUST FUND PROJECT,
https://housingtrustfundproject.org/campaigns/making-your-case/messages-that-work/public-opinion-research
(last visited Feb. 9, 2020); Poll: The Public Overwhelmingly Believes Housing Affordability Should Be a
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opinion about how those needs should be filled, but not as much debate about the
desirability of their being filled. Much of the debate relates to the priority of needs.
When a society has insufficient resources to achieve all the social goods about
which there is a strong consensus, the society must make choices about how to
prioritize them. I have called this problem “the conflict of competing goods.”2
There is a good deal of research and scholarly writing on how society makes these
choices, but little on how it ought to do so. This Article revisits the conflict of
competing goods using the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring3 as a catalyst.
Olmstead dealt with the anti-discrimination provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).4 The case was brought by two individuals, each of whom
had voluntarily admitted themselves to Georgia’s state mental facilities.5 Each had
subsequently been found by their respective treatment teams to be a good candidate
for treatment in then-existing community-based mental health programs.6 Each,
however, was not placed in such a facility and remained confined in state
institutions. 7 They sued the state of Georgia, claiming a violation of the antidiscrimination provisions contained in Title II of the ADA.
Georgia argued there was inadequate funding to accommodate the plaintiffs’
requests.8 The state claimed it was using all available funds to provide services to
other disabled persons and, therefore, it was not discriminating against the
plaintiffs based on their disabilities.9 The lower courts held the lack of funding did
not excuse the failure to place the plaintiffs in available community treatment
facilities.10 The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that “[u]njustified
isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability.” 11
However, the Court also accepted Georgia’s financial defense theory. The Court
held, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg:
[W]e recognize, as well, the States’ need to maintain a range of
facilities for the care and treatment of persons with diverse mental
disabilities, and the States’ obligation to administer services with
an even hand. Accordingly, we further hold that the Court of
Appeals’ remand instruction was unduly restrictive. In evaluating
Top National Priority; Expects Congress and President to Take Major Action, Opportunity Starts at Home,
https://www.opportunityhome.org/pollpressrelease (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
2. See Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing and the Conflict of Competing Goods: A Policy
Dilemma, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin
Paul Molloy eds., 2009).
3. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.”).
5. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 593.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 594.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 595.
11. Id. at 597.
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a State’s fundamental-alteration defense, the District Court must
consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only
the cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but
also the range of services the State provides others with mental
disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out those services
equitably.12
The holding, while recognizing the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from the
discrimination that existed, moderates those rights based on the financial capacity
of the state to comply. Justice Kennedy, in a partially concurring opinion, aptly
framed the issue:
No State has unlimited resources, and each must make hard
decisions on how much to allocate to treatment of diseases and
disabilities. If, for example, funds for care and treatment of the
mentally ill, including the severely mentally ill, are reduced in
order to support programs directed to the treatment and care of
other disabilities, the decision may be unfortunate. The judgment
is, however, a political one.13
Olmstead’s attempt to fashion a practical response to the questions presented
raises two serious theoretical questions. The first implicates the conflict of
competing goods—in Olmstead, the conflict between non-discrimination and
mental health services. The second concerns the interrelationship between several
social goods in which the improvement in one creates improvements in others—in
Olmstead, the savings to be derived from moving patients from an institutional
setting to a community one. These improvements might result in the government
avoiding a variety of public costs and in the creation of social benefits sufficient,
in the aggregate, to pay for the improvement. Such an outcome might lessen the
quandary of having to choose among competing goods.
If such savings and benefits could be achieved by making a social investment,
why are such investments not made? This question relates to the conflict of
competing goods in several ways. First, the social investment could result in
achieving a valued social good at limited net expenditure of resources. Second,
while it may lessen the quandary of prioritization of competing goods, it does not,
as I will discuss in Part III, below, eliminate it.
I should say at this point that I am not an expert in disability law or in
discrimination under the ADA. In fact, I know only what the reasonably well-read
layperson knows about these important issues. My participation in this discussion
derives more from my prior explorations of how a society with finite resources
ought to prioritize allocation of those resources. In pursuing this question, I have
previously examined the net effects of certain kinds of public expenditures to
determine why some such investments might not have been made, even where they
could result in a counterbalancing set of costs avoided or benefits gained. My goal
in this Article is to continue that examination.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

No. 2]

The Costs and Benefits of Affordable Housing

235

Assuming the benefits I allude to are demonstrable, there are several additional
issues that need to be addressed. For example, since not all the benefits to be
derived from providing additional housing will inure directly to the government,
how does the public capture the private benefit? Should the direct governmental
savings inure to the agencies that produced the housing? Each of the governmental
agencies involved in areas where benefits have accrued might argue that the
proceeds from these benefits ought to be allocated to them. They might rightly
argue that not all the societal goals in their particular field have been met and there
are insufficient total resources available to meet them. The conflict of competing
goods, redux.
These are among the questions that can be seen as presented by the Olmstead
opinion. The Court permits the state’s claim of lack of sufficient resources to place
the plaintiffs in a community facility to override the plaintiffs’ statutory right to
such a placement, a right that the Court recognizes in Olmstead.14 This overriding
of the plaintiffs’ right occurs despite the fact that placing them in community
facilities would likely be less costly than continuing their confinement in state
facilities. 15 The several opinions in Olmstead thus offer the opportunity to reexamine in context the two questions I posed earlier concerning the choice between
competing social goods and the method by which the government might recapture
and repurpose the benefits derived from making a particular choice.
Part II summarizes the argument that by providing additional affordable
housing for the benefit of low-income households there will be significant cost
savings to the government along with significant benefits to individual households
and to society as a whole. I will also suggest some reasons why, assuming my
working hypothesis is correct, society nonetheless fails to provide such housing.
Part III discusses the concept of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and the difficulty of
measuring the public benefit derived from certain types of social investments. I
will also discuss the ways in which some of the non-governmental benefits can be
quantified and monetized, and the fact that many of the resulting benefits cannot,
or should not, be monetized. Part III will conclude with a discussion of various
critiques of CBAs as applied to social investments. Part IV discusses the
investment in additional affordable housing in relation to CBA. I reprise the
problem of the conflict of competing goods and discuss how it relates to the
allocation decisions discussed in Part III. This includes a discussion of government
capture of some of the private benefit derived from additional affordable housing.
I conclude with some final thoughts about the relationship of CBAs to affordable
housing and to the conflict of competing goods.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The United States faces a severe shortage of decent housing that is affordable
to lower-income residents. For the most vulnerable households, the deficit in

14. Id. at 597.
15. Id. at 595, 607.
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affordable and available housing approximates eight million units.16 The effects of
the housing deficit are well documented in academic literature. Indeed, I have
explored the deficit at length in an earlier article.17 The impact of this deficit falls
predominantly on low-income households that often are faced with the choice
between living in sub-standard housing units, paying too high a percentage of their
income towards housing costs, or doubling up with another household in order to
manage the costs.18 The most extreme result of the deficit is homelessness.
A. The Effects of the Housing Deficit
In addition to these easily observable effects of the housing deficit, there are
also secondary effects of the lack of adequate and affordable housing. These latter
effects include poorer health outcomes, lower educational achievement, more
involvement with the criminal justice system and incarceration, and lower
productivity rates. What has been less recognized, at least in the legal literature,
has been the cost to society that can be attributed to the affordable housing deficit.
The costs of dealing with these effects through the use of Medicaid and Medicare,
the courts, police, correctional officers, and prisons, along with the lost educational
opportunities and work productivity, are borne by society as a whole.19
My point is not that the lack of decent affordable housing accounts for all of
these losses which, in the aggregate, are very large. There are many causes for poor
health, low academic achievement, and loss of productivity, and causality between
inadequate housing and these outcomes is difficult to show. Nevertheless, it is clear
the lack of decent affordable housing is a major contributor to such problems.20 In
the next sections, I will describe the magnitude of the aggregate loss for various
effects and suggest a framework to tie the losses to the affordable housing deficit.
1. Homelessness
Perhaps the most recognizable effect of the housing deficit is homelessness.
While not everyone who is homeless is so due to the housing deficit, a large
percentage of homeless persons can be attributed to the absence of available
affordable units.21 Moreover, according to the United States Interagency Council
on Homelessness, approximately “one-third of all people experiencing
16 . ANDREW AURAND ET AL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 2 (2017),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Gap-Report_2017.pdf (estimating that in 2017, there was a national
shortage of 7.4 million affordable and available rental homes for extremely low-income renters alone).
17. See Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing: Of Inefficiency, Market Distortion, and Government
Failure, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 979 (2019).
18. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–5
19. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 994–1005.
20. MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
PLANNING & DEV., THE 2018 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 10–12
(2018), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2018-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.
21. See, e.g., NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: OVERVIEW OF
DATA AND CAUSES, https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited
Feb. 16, 2020); Homelessness in America, THE NAT’L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
https://nationalhomeless.org/about-homelessness (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
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homelessness on a given night” are families with children. 22 That includes
approximately 58,000 households, or 188,000 people total, of whom more than
109,000 are children. 23 The costs of homelessness to the public have been
estimated to be upwards of seventeen billion dollars per year. 24 This does not
include lost opportunities to the public due to disrupted and incomplete educational
attainment (and the long-term effects of those losses), lower employment (and
lower-level employment), and losses in productivity (that is, workers producing
less than they are capable of producing due to absenteeism and what is known as
“presenteeism” 25 ) by the victims of homelessness. These public losses do not
include the suffering, both physical and emotional, of the homeless themselves and
of their families.
2. General Health
The deleterious health effects of homelessness are obvious. They include such
problems as exposure, violence, communicable diseases, malnutrition, substance
abuse, and stress, the costs of which in both dollars and human suffering are
overwhelming.26 But even for those who are housed, poor quality housing—and
standard housing that is overcrowded or that commands too high a percentage of a
household’s income—can lead to extremely negative health outcomes that have
both public and private consequences. Substandard housing results in higher risks
of illness 27 and injury. These are often due to poor construction or deferred
maintenance, and, on occasion, to the adaptations of one building component to
22 . U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: FOCUS ON
FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 1 (2018),
https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset_library/Homeslessness_in_America_Families_with_Chil
dren.pdf.
23. Id.
24. In an appearance on The Daily Show, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan stated that “[t]he thing we
finally figured out is that it’s actually, not only better for people, but cheaper to solve homelessness than it
is to put a band-aid on it. . . . Because, at the end of the day, it costs, between shelters and emergency rooms
and jails, it costs about $40,000 a year for a homeless person to be on the streets.” See Molly Moorhead,
HUD Secretary Says a Homeless Person Costs Taxpayers $40,000 a Year, POLITIFACT (Mar. 12, 2012,
3:59
PM),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/mar/12/shaun-donovan/hudsecretary-says-homeless-person-costs-taxpayers. Philip Mangano, the policy chief of President George W.
Bush’s homelessness program, indicated that “the cost of keeping people on the street added up to between
$35,000 and $150,000 per person per year.” Id. See also Malcom Gladwell, Million Dollar Murray, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, at 96, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/million-dollar-murray
(providing a narrative presentation of part of one man’s life on the streets).
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
26. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING: EVALUATING THE
EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING HEALTH OUTCOMES AMONG PEOPLE EXPERIENCING CHRONIC
HOMELESSNESS 38–57 (2018); see also COMM. ON HEALTHCARE FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE,
HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH, AND HUMAN NEEDS (1988).
27. DANNY FRIEDMAN, ECOTEC, SOCIAL IMPACT OF POOR HOUSING 14 (2010),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9406&rep=rep1&type=pdf (“The range of
potential hazards include (among others), damp, mold, excess cold or heat, danger of fire, carbon
monoxide, poor lighting, danger of falls, noise overcrowding and inadequate space, and structural integrity
of the building. The type of risks to health stemming from these hazards include respiratory and asthmatic
conditions, infections and other chest conditions, coronary disease and strokes, as well as fractures, burns,
and a range of psychological and mental health conditions that can be exacerbated by poor conditions.”).
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make up for the absence of another, such as using a stove, oven, or space heaters to
heat an apartment when there is no other source of heating.
Even when housing meets code requirements for health and safety, it may create
problems for low-income residents and for society. Many low-income residents are
cost burdened, meaning that they pay more than thirty percent of their income for
housing costs.28 A significant number of low-income households pay more than
fifty percent of their income for housing, which means they are “severely” cost
burdened. Either condition leaves households with too little of their already limited
income available for other household needs such as healthcare and medications,
wellness activities, and nutrition.29 Occasionally, the cost burden is the result of a
household’s conscious choice to pay more in order to live in a better neighborhood
with better housing, schools, and safety.30 In other situations, there is no real choice
and people seek the cheapest reasonably available alternative. In an attempt to limit
the cost burden, some households double up, thereby sharing the housing costs.31
This causes overcrowding with its concomitant problems for the housing unit and
for the doubled up households who are often still left with a cost burden, albeit a
smaller one.32 The health-related concerns include greater risks of communicable
illnesses, added stress, and emotional problems due to overcrowding, lack of
privacy, and noise.
Finally, the absence of sufficient numbers of decent affordable housing units
and the limited resources low-income households have to devote to housing costs
creates what has been called “housing insecurity,” even among those who are
housed. 33 A less obvious consequence of housing insecurity and the resulting
frequent changes of housing accommodations is the less stable access to social
services and health care.34

28. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 2 (“[71%] of ELI [extremely low income] renter households
are severely cost-burdened, spending more than half of their incomes on rent and utilities. These 8.1 million
severely cost-burdened households account for 72.6% of all severely cost-burdened renter households in
the U.S. . . . [33%] of very low income (VLI) renter households; 8.2% of low income (LI) renter
households, and 2.4% of middle income (MI) renter households are severely cost-burdened.”).
29 . See NABIJAJ MAQBOOL ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON HEALTH: A
RESEARCH SUMMARY 2 (2015), https://www.rupco.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/The-Impacts-ofAffordable-Housing-on-Health-CenterforHousingPolicy-Maqbool.etal.pdf (“Families paying excessive
amounts of their income for housing often have insufficient resources remaining for other essential needs,
including food, medical insurance, and health care.”).
30. Sandra J. Newman, Does Housing Matter for Poor Families? A Critical Summary of Research
and Issues Still to Be Resolved, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 895, 905 (2008).
31. Laryssa Mykyta & Natasha Philkauskas, Does Doubling Up Improve Family Well-Being?, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Mar.
31,
2016)
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/researchmatters/2016/03/does-doubling-up-improve-family-well-being.html.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Robynn Cox et al., Measuring Population Estimates of Housing Insecurity in the United
States: A Comprehensive Approach 1 (Dec. 19, 2017) (working paper series for the Washington Ctr. for
Equitable Growth), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/12192017-WP-measuringhousing-insecurity.pdf.
34. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 5; see also, Diamond, supra note 2, at 1001–03.
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3. Educational Losses
Inadequate and unaffordable housing has a negative impact on the educational
achievement of children, both directly and indirectly. 35 The lost educational
accomplishment affects the individuals concerned, their families, and society. Less
education equates with lower employment levels and lower lifetime income.36 This
in turn results in lower tax revenue for every level of government and greater usage
of public social services such as Medicaid, public assistance, and unemployment
insurance. Lower educational attainment is also associated with more frequent
interactions with the criminal justice and correctional systems.37
4. Productivity Losses
Society suffers when employees are absent from work or, less visibly, when
employees show up for work but cannot perform to their full potential. The latter
situation is known as “presenteeism” and accounts for a significant loss in
productivity. 38 While not all the productivity loss can be attributed to poor or
unaffordable housing, much of it can.39 Thus, the provision of decent affordable
housing would likely correct some of the productivity loss due to both absenteeism
and presenteeism.
B. Explaining the Housing Deficit
I have previously offered several possible explanations for the deficit of decent
affordable housing units. The possibilities range from the obvious to the obscure.

35. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 1003–4.
36. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.c.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., MAYO CLINIC HEALTH SOLUTIONS, THE TRUE COST OF POOR HEALTH 1 (2008),
http://www.mywellbeingjourney.com/PDF/Marketing/Mayo-True_Cost_of_Poor_Health.pdf (“[M]any
organizations currently don’t pay enough attention to the hidden costs of avoidable sick days and
presenteeism – the cost of employees who are on the job but not fully functioning because of real illnesses
and medical conditions, including asthma, seasonal allergies, arthritis, migraines, depression, back pain,
gastrointestinal disorders and diabetes. . . . Depression costs U.S. employers more than $35 billion a year
in reduced performance at work. On-the-job pain (including back pain, headaches and arthritis) costs
employers nearly $47 billion a year in productivity loss. In one study, chronic conditions alone were
estimated to cost The Dow Chemical Company more than $100 million annually in lost productivity for
its U.S. work force – the equivalent of 6.8 percent of total lab costs for the company in 2002. One research
team calculated the total cost of presenteeism in the United States to be greater than $150 billion per year.”);
see also Bruce Japsen, U.S. Workforce Illness Costs $576B Annually from Sick Days to Workers
Compensation, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2012/09/12/u-sworkforce-illness-costs-576b-annually-from-sick-days-to-workers-compensation
(“The
Integrated
Benefits Institute, which represents major U.S. employers and business coalitions, says poor health costs
the U.S. economy $576 billion a year, according to new research. Of that amount, 39 percent, or $227
billion is from ‘lost productivity’ from employee absenteeism due to illness or what researchers called
‘presenteeism,’ when employees report to work but illness keeps them from performing at their best.”).
39. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
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1. Misaligned Incentives
Among the obvious reasons for the deficit is that there is very little incentive
for developers to produce affordable housing.40 The profit potential for market-rate
housing is far greater than for housing that is affordable to people below eighty
percent of the area median income (AMI). By definition, low-income households
have difficulty paying market rates in many of the nation’s communities. Without
government (or other) subsidies, developers and landlords would take on
significant economic risk (not to mention opportunity costs) by providing
affordable housing. However, if there are significant societal savings and benefits
to be had through the provision of decent affordable housing, one might think the
market ought to provide it.
2. Legal Barriers to Development
There are several legal barriers to the development of affordable housing that
either make such housing impossible to build or increase to unmanageable levels
the costs of building. Density, lot size, setback, and height restrictions are among
the barriers that fit this model. There are also environmental regulations, impact
fees, and permitting issues that increase costs and/or create delays in developing
the property.41 Several commentators have noted the effect that regulatory issues
have on the supply of affordable housing and on housing prices.42
3. Political Barriers
There is a connection between the legal barriers to the creation of affordable
housing and the political ones.43 The latter fall into two broad categories: private
resistance, often manifested through NIMBYism (the Not in my Backyard
phenomenon); and public choice issues. NIMBYism is generally recognized as
groups opposed to a particular development organizing and, through political
action (legal or extra-legal in nature), making public their opposition to that
development. That action might also take the form of demonstrations, lobbying, or
finding or promoting candidates for public office who support the group’s
immediate or long-term view concerning development in their neighborhood.
The public choice theory, on the other hand, applies classical rational person
economic analysis to decision-making by public officials. The theory posits that
such officials place a high value on remaining in office and therefore make
40. Michael Diamond & J. Peter Byrne, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The
Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 530 (2007).
41. Id.; see also Diamond, supra note 2, at 989.
42. See Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20536, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20536.pdf (“[R]egulation
appears to be the single most important influence on the supply of homes.”); see also Michael H. Schill,
Regulation and Housing Development: What We Know, 8 CITYSCAPE 5, 8 (2005) (“[S]ome regulations
may generate a surplus of benefits over costs, but the benefits will primarily inure to higher income families
and the costs to low- and moderate-income families.”).
43. Diamond, supra note 2, at 991.
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decisions calculated to achieve that result even if that decision conflicts with what
they might prefer in their private capacity.44 This leads them to vote as desired by
contributors and those who are active and influential politically. That normally
does not include low-income individuals and their advocates.
III. THE MAGNITUDE OF PUBLIC BENEFIT FROM
PROVIDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING
There are estimates that the housing deficit for extremely low-income
households in United States approaches eight million units.45 The cost to develop
anything approaching that number of units could be well over one trillion dollars.46
In addition, the ongoing operations of those units would need to be subsidized.
Today, the federal government spends approximately fifty billion dollars
annually 47 on affordable housing and, of course, it would have to spend
considerably more than that if significant numbers of new affordable units came
online.
In order to determine whether the massive costs of producing and subsidizing
such housing would be economically beneficial, one might, as government
agencies must do prior to promulgating significant new regulations, perform a
CBA. 48 While there is a robust academic and political debate concerning the
appropriateness of performing a CBA in the face of human need, there are at least
two strains of literature that attempt to address this issue.49 The first looks at the
problem of unquantifiable costs or benefits in the context of a CBA. The second
addresses the rate of return on “social investment.”
While there is a body of costs and benefits that are large, observable,
quantifiable, and monetizable, other benefits are much harder to quantify or to
monetize. These include personhood benefits, such as self-esteem and a sense of
well-being, the value of which are supposed to be included when preparing a CBA.
44. James Buchanan, one of the progenitors of public choice theory, has said:
Public choice theory has been the avenue through which a romantic and illusory set
of notions about the workings of governments and the behavior of persons who
govern has been replaced by a set of notions that embody more skepticism about what
governments can do and what governors will do, notions that are surely more
consistent with the political reality that we may all observe about us.
James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its
Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II, at 11, 13 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds.,
1984).
45. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
46. Olivia Barrow, New Report Finds Reasonable Development Costs in Housing Credit Units
Nationwide, ENTERPRISE (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/blog/2018/09/new-reportfinds-reasonable-development-costs-in-housing-credit-units.
47 . CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO-50782, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2015) (“In 2014, the federal government provided about $50 billion in housing assistance
specifically designated for low income households. . . . Since that time, such assistance has remained
relatively stable at about $50 billion annually.”).
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (amending and consolidating
several Reagan-era orders).
49. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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Through the remainder of this Part, I will discuss the problem of benefits that are
hard to quantify or monetize. I will also catalog a magnitude of benefits to be
derived from providing and subsidizing a sufficient number of affordable housing
units.
Each social cost I discuss strongly correlates with inadequate or unaffordable
housing. Yet there are factors other than housing that also correlate with the
negative outcomes presented. Many of these other factors, such as poverty, lack of
employment skills, and health, have a significant interaction with housing, making
causality between any of these factors and the outcome difficult to establish.50
Thus, the problematic issues of quantification and monetization.
In this Section, I will discuss two theories, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and
Social Return on Investment (SROI), that purport to aid in efforts to quantify and
monetize the costs and benefits of any action or decision. Each theory purports to
do a more complete analysis of the costs and benefits of government providing for
additional decent, affordable housing units. While I believe the two theories have
significant flaws, I have adopted their use here because they have achieved favor
with a segment of the economics and political establishment. I will offer a critique
of these theories, particularly CBAs, but will utilize them to show that affordable
housing would meet their economic requirements. My goal is to show that even
using devices favored by economists and politicians, the production of
significantly more affordable housing is warranted.
A. Quantifying the Unquantifiable, Monetization,
and Social Return on Investment
The federal government has never provided the support necessary to close the
gap between the number of decent and affordable housing units needed and the
number of such units that exist. There are many theories as to why that support has
been lacking, the most benign of which is that the realities of the economy and of
government resources do not justify or permit the investment. While I do not in
this Article address the wide array of theories that have been put forward on this
point, I do wish to concentrate on a particular one—the economic and government
resource argument.
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Ever since the first Executive Order, in 1981, 51 requiring that CBAs be
undertaken prior to major regulations, agencies and scholars have been aware of
the problem of uncertainty in quantifying and monetizing costs and, particularly,

50. One’s lack of means can lead not only to poor housing but also to poor health, poor educational
opportunities, and a contraction of life experiences, including employment opportunities and performance.
Moreover, health impacts educational achievement and vice versa. Both impact job possibilities which in
turn impact health and education. I have chosen housing as the focal point of this analysis because it is
physically central to everyday existence and is most responsive immediately to direct intervention.
51. Exec. Order No. 12,991, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
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benefits. 52 In fact, the Orders specifically empower the agencies to consider
benefits that cannot be quantified such as dignity, fairness, and distributional
affects. 53 This Article does not deal with issues related to the adoption of
regulations. It deals instead with problems of adopting policy and, perhaps,
legislation. But, as Cass Sunstein, a strong advocate for CBA, stated in an article
dealing with the problem of difficult-to-quantify costs and benefits: “. . . it should
be clear [throughout this article] that the implications are far broader [than simply
regulatory policy]. In many areas of law and policy, it is important and perhaps
even necessary to catalog both costs and benefits and to explore whether the
benefits justify the costs.”54
With this idea in mind, I want to adapt for the purpose of this discussion the
same type of required Cost-Benefit Analysis for major regulatory proposals to the
broader realm of government policy and budgetary action in relation to affordable
housing.55 In doing so, however, I will refer to and discuss some of the critiques of
CBAs, particularly those concerning the problems of uncertainty and
incommensurability.
Many commentators have addressed the problem of uncertainty in both the
quantification and monetization of costs and benefits.56 Sunstein recognizes that
agencies are often presented with difficult-to-quantify-or-monetize costs or
benefits. He points out that, often, they do not engage in such quantification. In
this regard, Sunstein notes three types of problems associated with an agency’s
effort to quantify or monetize any particular cost or benefit. The first, he says, is
“epistemic,” a lack of knowledge about how to quantify and monetize the cost or
benefit.57 The second involves a quarrel with “standard economic thinking about
monetization”—that the numbers derived from an analysis would not be an
“appropriate basis for policy.”58 The third relates to incommensurability; that is,
that one attribute—human dignity, for example—cannot be made the equivalent
of a sum of money.59

52. The most recent Executive Orders are Exec. Order No. 13,771, 89 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017)
and Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
53. 76 Fed. Reg. at 3821 (“Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and
discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity,
fairness, and distributive impacts.”).
54. Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (2014).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 340
(2006) (“Quantitative risk assessment has proven quite daunting, because data gaps make estimating the
number of illnesses, deaths, and ecological disturbances a particular regulation will avoid impossible for
most health effects and nearly all ecological effects. When agencies can estimate the magnitude of some
health effects, that estimation usually requires a lot of guesswork in order to extrapolate estimates of a
discrete regulation’s impact on human health from data that often comes from laboratory tests on other
species or from human experience with much larger doses than those that the rules under consideration
address.”).
57. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 1375.
58. Id. at 1375–76.
59. Id. at 1376.
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Sunstein goes on to propose several ways for an agency to address these
problems, all of which he compiles under a heading of “breakeven analysis.”60 To
summarize, Sunstein wants agencies to narrow, as much as possible, the space
between the quantifiable and monetizable costs and the quantifiable and
monetizable benefits.61 Then, concerning the resulting gap, he asks, “[h]ow high
would the benefits have to be in order for the costs to be justified?”62
Masur and Posner also recognize the uncertainties inherent in the conduct of
CBAs by agencies.63 They studied “all the major regulations issued by agencies
from 2010 to 2013” and found “countless examples . . . where agencies fail to fully
monetize the benefits and costs of regulations” even though, in most cases, they
could have done so. 64 Since CBAs are intended as a “decision procedure that
requires the decision-maker to estimate both the benefits and the costs of a
regulation in monetary terms” they point out that when “a regulator chooses not to
monetize all the benefits or all the costs, it is not doing a cost-benefit analysis.”65
They then ask, “[i]f it is not doing cost-benefit analysis, what is it doing?”66
They recognize two distinct problems in conducting a CBA. The first is one of
causation: whether there is “empirical uncertainty as to whether the regulation will
have the intended behavioral effects.” 67 The second problem involves
monetization: “certain benefits are hard to monetize because no market exists in
those benefits.”68 Taking on the monetization problem, Masur and Posner propose
a method for agencies to engage in Cost-Benefit Analysis when they don’t have a
“reliable basis” for making a valuation.69 That method involves regulators making
(20“reasonable guesses about the harms or benefits of regulations.” 70 These
60. Id. at 1385. Sunstein reprises the phrase “breakeven analysis” from OMB Circular A-4, which
provides authoritative guidance on regulatory impact analysis, and states:
It will not always be possible to express in monetary units all of the important benefits
and costs. When it is not, the most efficient alternative will not necessarily be the one
with the largest quantified and monetized net-benefit estimate. In such cases, you
should exercise professional judgment in determining how important the
nonquantified benefits or costs may be in the context of the overall analysis. If the
nonquantified benefits and costs are likely to be important, you should carry out a
“threshold” analysis to evaluate their significance. Threshold or “break-even”
analysis answers the question, “How small could the value of the nonquantified
benefits be (or how large would the value of the nonquantified costs need to be) before
the rule would yield zero net benefits?” In addition to threshold analysis you should
indicate, where possible, which nonquantified effects are most important and why.
Id. (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND
ESTABLISHMENTS REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003))
61. Id. at 1385–89.
62. Id. at 1387.
63. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under
Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016).
64. Id. at 92.
65. Id. at 89.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 95.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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guesses would be based “on the experience and latent knowledge of the agency
staff.”71
In elaborating on this proposal, Masur and Posner describe an Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)72 staff member who has worked at the
agency for decades and has developed an “intuitive sense of when chemical
substances are dangerous and when they are not.”73 While the staff member may
not be certain of her intuition, she believes it is correct. Masur and Posner call this
a Bayesian “prior,” which they characterize as more than a “random guess” and as
providing “useful information.”74
They develop this idea by pointing out that there is a distinction between CBAs
as a procedure and CBAs as a set of inputs.75 Procedurally, CBAs direct agencies
to “issue regulations if the benefits exceed the costs.”76 As a set of inputs, CBAs
are silent concerning the types of informational inputs the agency should use.
Masur and Posner state that:
Regulators should use all relevant informational inputs when they
conduct cost-benefit analyses . . . This means that the regulator’s
prior should be used rather than disregarded. The process of
repeatedly updating the prior in light of new information has a
dynamic or Bayesian quality that distinguishes it from cost-benefit
analysis as traditionally understood.77
Of course, the agency must articulate and justify its prior so there can be
critical evaluation of it.78 The agency should quantify all the benefits it perceives
in light of its articulated prior, even benefits thought difficult to quantify and
monetize.
Amy Sinden reiterates the point that many CBAs fail to quantify or monetize
important benefits stemming from regulation. 79 She analyzed forty-five CBAs
conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and found that in thirtysix of them the “EPA described as ‘significant,’ or ‘substantial’ categories of
benefits that the agency excluded as unquantifiable due to data limitations. Indeed,
in certain instances, the monetized benefits estimate left out the value of
ameliorating the very harm at which the rule itself was aimed.”80 Such a failure
raises significant questions about the value of CBAs. In short, to reprise Masur and
Posner’s query, “[i]f it is not doing cost-benefit analysis, what is it doing?”81

71. Id.
72. OSHA is an agency of the U.S. government within the U.S. Department of Labor that is charged
with ensuring the health and safety of workers while on the job. See About OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
73. Masur & Posner, supra note 63, at 119.
74. Id. at 119–20.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 121.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 125.
79. Amy Sinden, The Problem of Unquantified Benefits, 49 ENVTL. L. 73 (2019).
80. Id. at 79–80.
81. See Masur & Posner, supra note 62, at 89.
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2. Social Return on Investment
In a similar vein, but with a very different focus, is the concept of Social Return
on Investment (SROI). 82 SROI purports to “measure the level of social value
created by the activities of social enterprise.”83 For this purpose, social investment
is a capacious concept including investment for social good by the non-profit,
public, benefit corporation, and even mission-driven for-profit sectors of the
economy. There are more narrow definitions of social investment; Ryan and Lyne,
for example, have defined a social enterprise as one which engages in business
“with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for
that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the
need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.” 84 For our purposes,
however, the scope of the definition is relatively unimportant.
SROI analysis is very similar to CBA with a few major differences. The main
one is that SROI is often applied to entities that do not have a profit motive or, in
some instances, have a mixed profit and social motive. Entities such as
government, non-profits, and, to a lesser extent, benefit corporations seek social
gains as their goal, or, at least, as a significant goal of the enterprise. Thus,
according to one group of commentators SROI is “‘a form of adjusted cost-benefit
analysis that takes into account, in a more holistic way, the various types of impact’
that programs have . . . . From a technical point of view, we argue there is not much
difference between classical cost-benefit analysis . . . and SROI.”85
As such, SROI faces the same challenges in valuing intangible benefits as the
CBA model. It is difficult to capture in monetary terms the increase in a
beneficiary’s feeling of well-being or, as Arvidson et al. state, in the “improvement
of personal utility (i.e. quality of life).” 86 Arvidson et al. also point out other
problems with SROI analysis, such as causality and displacement issues. 87
Nevertheless, they note, much as I have, that “proponents suggest it is important
to quantify [intangible values] despite these limitations as an economic value is
able to have more influence over policy and commercial interests.”88
Other bases that have been presented for pursuing additional affordable
housing have failed to produce that housing. Perhaps an economic argument will
get greater attention.
82. The concept of SROI was first developed in the late 1990s by the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund
(REDF). SROI “measures enterprises’ social benefits to society through outcomes.” Measurement and Evaluation,
REDF, https://redf.org/the-impact/measurement-evaluation (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). Since then, there has been a
significant body of literature about SROI. See also, e.g., Dr. Malin Arvidson et al., The Ambitions and Challenges of
SROI 4 (Third Sector Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 49, 2010), http://bigpushforward.net/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/the_ambitions_and_challenges_of_sroi.pdf; Patrick W. Ryan & Issac Lyne, Social
Enterprise and the Measurement of Social Value: Methodological Issues with the Calculation and Application of the
Social Return on Investment, 2 EDUC., KNOWLEDGE & ECON. 223 (2008).
83. Ryan & Lyne, supra note 82, at 223.
84. Id. at 224.
85. Arvidson et al., supra note 82, at 4.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 13. Displacement refers to the beneficiary of a social investment benefiting at the expense
of someone else who would have obtained the benefit and now does not.
88. Id. at 12.
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B. Observable and Not-So-Observable Benefits of Decent Affordable Housing
For about forty years, there has been a federal requirement that, prior to
proposing a “major” rule, all federal executive agencies (other than independent
agencies), must prepare a CBA.89 The analysis must lay out the costs and benefits
of the proposed regulation and provide a justification for the regulatory scheme
proposed. 90 In some cases, the costs and benefits are easily identifiable,
quantifiable, and monetizable—that is, converted into a dollar equivalent. In
others, the costs and, more typically, the benefits, either cannot be measured, or
the measurable elements cannot be converted to monetary terms.91 I propose in this
section to apply Cost-Benefit Analysis to the provision of affordable housing.
As I pointed out earlier, many costs to society can be attributed to the lack of
decent affordable housing. Strong correlations have been found between poor or
unaffordable housing and specific outcomes for low-income residents in areas such
as health, education, criminal justice, employment, and productivity. Many of
these costs could be avoided through the provision of decent affordable housing,
although it is not clear exactly how much of the costs could thus be avoided. There
are other costs, in areas such as human dignity and concepts of justice and equality,
that also could be avoided by the provision of such housing. The avoidance of these
costs are benefits to society and ought to be accounted for in any CBA. There are,
however, problems in quantifying and monetizing some of these costs and
problems in identifying causality between the absence of housing and the
associated costs.
1. Hard to Measure Benefits
In this section I will point out some of the less readily visible, quantifiable, or
monetizable benefits to society of providing affordable housing. Where possible, I
will attempt to indicate an order of magnitude for the costs avoided or the benefits
obtained.
a. Homelessness
The area with the most solid causal connections involves homelessness. Not
only is the connection between an inadequate supply of affordable housing and
homelessness readily apparent, but we can also quantify and monetize most of the
harms associated with homelessness. These involve direct out-of-pocket costs to
society and indirect costs such as educational deficits, employment and
productivity losses, and damage to the lives of homeless people.92
Programs such as Housing First 93 focus on getting homeless people into
permanent housing without prerequisites such as sobriety, counseling, or securing
89. Exec. Order No. 12,991, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
90. Id.
91. See generally Sunstein, supra note 54; see also Masur & Posner, supra note 63.
92. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 996–1012.
93. See Housing First, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS,
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employment. They have proven quite successful in keeping formerly homeless
individuals and families housed as well as in the reduction of their use of expensive
social services.94 The cost savings associated with this lower level of use have been
substantial.95 There has not been, however, a calculation of the value of an increase
in dignity, self-esteem, or engagement with society to the formerly homeless
individual or families. Similarly, there has not been a clear measurement of the
benefits to local communities from greater access to public space due to the lower
levels of homeless encampments, panhandling, or petty crime. Moreover, there has
been little measurement of the possible increase in business activity in or the
improved appearance and usage of downtown shopping districts that might result
from housing large numbers of formerly homeless people who congregated in such
districts.
As I mentioned, the causal connection between providing housing to the
homeless and societal cost savings and benefits is clear, but it is not absolute.
Among the imperfections in the causal claim is that not all homeless people will
benefit from a Housing First (or similar) approach. Some will remain homeless,
others will return to homelessness, and many will continue to utilize costly public
services or have a negative impact on local communities. Nevertheless, significant
direct cost savings can be observed (or can be projected based on more stable
health and education) while other cost savings can be strongly intuited. Surely, for
example, the gains in human dignity, self-esteem, and society’s sense of equality
and social justice will exist despite being hard to quantify or to monetize.
b. General Health
Similar difficulties are present concerning the effects of poor or unaffordable
housing on the general health of residents. The overall governmental cost of health
care in the United States is more than one trillion dollars per year.96 Additional
cost is attributed to charitable organizations and to hospitals which provide
emergency care, often without reimbursement.97 While not all public health care
https://endhomelessness.org/resource/housing-first (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
94. See, e.g., Angela Ly & Eric Latimer, Housing First Impact on Costs and Associated Cost Offsets:
A Review of the Literature, 60 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 475, 475–76, 482, 485–86 (2015) (“While our review
casts doubt on whether [Housing First] programs can be expected to pay for themselves, the certainty of
significant cost offsets, combined with their benefits for participants, means that they represent a more
efficient allocation of resources than traditional services.”); see also Mary E. Larimer et al., Health Care
and Public Service Use and Costs Before and After Provision of Housing for Chronically Homeless
Persons with Severe Alcohol Problems, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1349, 1349 (2009) (“The provision of
housing reduces hospital visits, admissions, and duration of hospital stays among homeless individuals,
and overall public system spending is reduced by nearly as much as is spent on housing.”).
95. See Ly & Latimer, supra note 94.
96. Sara Kliff, Health-Care Spending, VOX (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.vox.com/2014/4/30/18077016/health-care-spending.
97. See, e.g., Maureen Groppe, Who Pays When Someone Without Insurance Shows Up in the ER?,
USA TODAY (July 3, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/03/who-pays-whensomeone-without-insurance-shows-up-er/445756001; Drew Calvert, Who Bears the Cost of the
Uninsured? Nonprofit Hospitals, KELLOGGINSIGHT (June 22, 2015),
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/who-bears-the-cost-of-the-uninsured-nonprofit-hospitals.
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spending is attributable to housing problems, a significant portion of it is.
According to researchers, “[a]s of January 2017, an estimated 553,742 people in
the United States experience homelessness on a given night and in 2016, 30 million
households in the United States reported having significant physical or health
hazards within their homes.”98 Concerning the importance of housing to health,
one commentator has argued: “housing is a critical vaccine that can pave the way
to long-term health and well-being.”99
Consider the problems that may attend to those in inadequate units or cost
burdened households. There may be insufficient funds for preventative care or for
proper nutrition.100 Similarly, children exposed to environmental hazards such as
lead paint, mold, or allergens often exhibit developmental difficulties and chronic
conditions that may plague them throughout their lives.101 Each of these issues can
lead to educational deficits, which often presage employment and productivity
deficits.
In addition to problems with the housing itself, the effects of housing
insecurity, which describes the psychological effects on an individual of the loss
of, or perceived threat of losing, his or her home add a significant cost. This
situation has been referred to as “pre-homelessness.” 102 The costs of housing
insecurity may be the least visible of the health issues attributed to the lack of
affordable housing and often involves a housing insecure resident making several
moves within a short period of time.
The effects of housing insecurity manifest themselves in a variety of ways
including high levels of stress and hyper-tension, 103 lack of stable access to
continuous health and social service, 104 and loss of social networks and the
corresponding social safety net.105 Concerning the effect on children, Maqbool et
al. found
Children without stable housing were more likely to use
emergency department services as a result of a lack of a regular
health care provider. Children under three years who had moved
two or more times in the previous year were found to have lower
weight for their age . . . and they were at greater risk of
developmental problems. Among adolescents, a significant

98. Stephanie Diaz, The Effects of Housing Insecurity on Health Outcomes and Costs, HEALTHIFY
BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.healthify.us/healthify-insights/the-effects-of-housinginstability-on-health-outcomes-and-costs. Diaz goes on to report that almost thirty-three percent of
emergency room visits are made by the homeless and that each visit costs up to $3,700. Id.
99. Megan T. Sandel, Housing Is a Critical Vaccine, ENTERPRISE (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.enterprisecommunity.org/2016/02/housing-critical-vaccine.
100. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
101. Id. at 5.
102. See BROOKE SPELLMAN ET AL., COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRST-TIME HOMELESSNESS FOR
FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS A-14 (2010),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/pdf/Costs_Homeless.pdf.
103. MAQBOOL ET AL., supra note 29, at 3–4.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id. at 6.
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association was found between early use of illicit drugs and
moving four or more times before the age of sixteen years.106
Some of the costs of these problems will be captured in the healthcare costs or
in the losses attributed to employment or productivity deficits. Others will not and
those losses are very difficult to quantify or monetize.
c. Education
As we have seen, there is a good deal of writing about the relationship between
housing and education.107 There is also robust literature concerning the cost to
society of educational deficits and the benefits to be derived by society for
students’ achieving a higher educational level.108 For example, Carroll and Erkut
point out the “benefits to taxpayers from increases in students’ educational
attainment are very high” and “those benefits are entirely separate from the
benefits that the students themselves gain through increased education.”109
Some of the benefits are easily recognizable and quantifiable. For example,
increasing one’s education is likely to increase one’s earning capacity. Carroll and
Erkut suggest that for each additional year of schooling one might expect on
average a seven to ten percent increase in earnings.110 What is less immediately
apparent is the benefit to the public through the increase in federal, state, and local
taxes (including sales and property taxes) along with increased payments to Social
Security and to Medicare.
While Carroll and Erkut point out there are demographic differences in the
amount of increased expected income based on race and gender, they project a
discounted present value (in 2002 dollars) of a lifetime increase in tax payments
made by high school dropouts and by college graduates to be between $128,000
and $192,000.111 Levin et al. made a similar calculation, but theirs is based on a
lifetime earnings and tax differential, without reducing them to a present value
figure. 112 Again, they point out demographic and gender differences, with the
lifetime increased earnings ranging from approximately $250,000 for white female

106. Id. at 3.
107. See MAYA BRENNAN ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING ON EDUCATION: A
RESEARCH SUMMARY 7 (2014), https://www.nhc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/The-Impacts-ofAffordable-Housing-on-Education-1.pdf; Rebekah Coley et al., Relations Between Housing
Characteristics and the Well-Being of Low-Income Children and Adolescents, 49 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1775,
1776, 1785 (2013). I have also written on this issue, see Diamond, supra note 2, at 1003.
108. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL & EMRE ERKUT, THE BENEFITS TO TAXPAYERS FROM INCREASES IN
STUDENTS’ EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (2009),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG686.pdf; see also HENRY LEVIN ET
AL., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN (2007),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8CF9QG9; BYRON G. AUGUSTE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC
COST OF THE US EDUCATION GAP (2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/theeconomic-cost-of-the-us-education-gap.
109. CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 108, at iii.
110. Id. at 15; see also LEVIN ET AL., supra note 108, at 7.
111. CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 108, at 37–38.
112. LEVIN ET AL., supra note 108, at 7.
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dropouts to approximately $2,000,000 for white male college graduates. 113
Similarly, the increased lifetime tax payments range from approximately $80,000
for white female dropouts to approximately $900,000 for white male college
graduates.114
There are several other public cost savings that highly correlate with increased
education. Since more highly educated people typically earn higher incomes, there
is a reduced call for publicly supported social program funds. These include such
items as public assistance and Supplemental Security Income, food stamps,
housing subsidies, and Medicaid. 115 Increased educational attainment is also
correlated with decreased criminal activity. This is due to the lower need for
criminal activity to support oneself as well as the higher opportunity costs for
committing crimes. This should result in a downward movement of expenditures
for police, courts, prisons and jails, as well as for the total costs of incarceration.116
Again, these assessments deal only with the reduction in public expenditures
and do not count the private benefit of individuals feeling safer due to the reduction
in crime or the self-esteem benefits to the employed person who need not resort to
crime. There will, however, also be secondary benefits to society. For example, the
higher incomes earned by those who increase their educational attainment will
result in a multiplier effect. 117 Some of the additional income will be spent to
purchase goods and services. As these will be new inputs into the economy, these
expenditures will provide new income to the vendors of those goods and services,
who will, in turn, spend some of their increased income on additional employees,
goods and services, and so on. Furthermore, the higher educational attainment of
individuals will lead to more productivity for their employers and the same
multiplier effect should apply. These are benefits that, despite the difficulty of
quantifying and monetizing, need to be included in a more comprehensive CBA.
d. Productivity
I have discussed earlier the relationship between poor quality or unaffordable
housing and health.118 When that relationship is superimposed onto the workplace,
the effects are absenteeism, presenteeism, and other reductions in productivity.
Presenteeism has been defined as “being present at work but unable to be fully
engaged in the work environment. This condition leads to measurable loss of
productivity due to physical, mental, and emotional health conditions or related to
work, personal, social, and emotional life issues.”119 Presenteeism has an impact
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 12 (estimating the present value of lifetime public health care savings by high school
graduates over dropouts to average $40,000); see also id. at 15 (estimating the savings of education on
other welfare programs); CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 107, at 19, 41–60.
116. LEVIN ET AL., supra note 107, at 13; see also CARROLL & ERKUT, supra note 107, at 21.
117. Akhilesh Ganti, Multiplier Effect, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/multipliereffect.asp (explaining the definition of “multiplier effect”).
118. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
119. Diane M. Lack, Presenteeism Revisited: A Comprehensive Review, 59 WORKPLACE HEALTH &
SAFETY J. 77, 77 (2011).
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on “individuals and organizations—including effects on quality of life and health,
increased health care costs, adverse effects for coworkers, increased occupational
accidents related to distractibility, and deterioration of service and product
quality.”120
One group of commentators state that for the set of chronic conditions studied,
“the costs associated with performance based work loss or ‘presenteeism’ greatly
exceeded the combined costs of absenteeism and medical treatment combined.”121
They found the average annual health related costs at the major U.S. employer they
studied were, in 2002 dollars, $2,278 for medical care, $661 due to absenteeism,
and $6,721 due to presenteeism. 122 Lack has stated that the annual cost of
presenteeism to the economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century was 180
billion dollars.123
C. A Short Critique of CBAs
There is a body of literature that is critical of the CBA approach for reasons
other than the technical one of not being able to quantify or monetize certain kinds
of social benefits. 124 These critiques include objections to the position of most
CBA advocates that CBA provides an “objective” 125 or “neutral” 126 analysis to
reach efficient outcomes. One such critic, Lisa Heinzerling, wrote a reply to Cass
Sunstein’s argument in favor of “breakeven analysis.”127 In it, Heinzerling takes
on Sunstein’s claim that breakeven analysis softens the harshness of a traditional
CBA, but her critique goes beyond breakeven analysis to implicate problems with
CBAs themselves. She states:
If breakeven analysis were, as Professor Sunstein suggests, a way
“to avoid the risks that judgments will be based on anecdotes,
intuitions, dogmas, impressions, or the power of self-interested
private groups,” one would predict that agencies would deploy it
across a full range of rules with costs or benefits that are difficult
to quantify or monetize. If agencies do not do this, then one must
120. Id.
121. James J. Collins et al., The Assessment of Chronic Health Conditions on Work Performance,
Absence, and Total Economic Impact for Employers, 47 J. OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. 547, 557
(2005).
122. Id. at 554.
123. Lack, supra note 119, at 80.
124. For an interesting breakdown of arguments both in favor of and opposed to Cost-Benefit
Analysis, see Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1998).
125. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 59–61
(2012) (“In reality, CBA inevitably requires value judgments that are inherently subjective, rendering the
analyses potentially manipulable for political ends.”).
126. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 56, at 1; see also Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 389 (1981) (arguing “there is no ‘neutral’ or
‘correct’ way to solve this problem [the value of impacts on people], that the liberal procedure with respect
to it has been inconsistent, and the recognition of value judgments involved in selecting a solution would
deprive the efficiency calculus of some of its bogus air of objectivity”).
127. Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1457,
1458 (2014).
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ask whether breakeven analysis is being selectively deployed to
rescue only those rules that are already deemed worthy on some
basis other than cost-benefit analysis. If there is such deployment
of breakeven analysis, then it is possible that the use of breakeven
analysis itself may reflect “anecdotes, intuitions, dogmas,
impressions, or the power of self-interested private groups.” That
would be a problem for Professor Sunstein’s account of the utility
of breakeven analysis.128
The fact is, Cost-Benefit Analysis is just one of many ways that one might
evaluate the efficacy of a proposal. Its proponents laud its objectivity, but fail to
account for the normative choice that underlies it: that economic efficiency is the
value that should be privileged rather than human life, environmental protection,
or any number of other competing values.129 As such, CBA is based on a series of
subjective, often highly politicized, starting stimuli and carries no more value than
any other subjectively based analysis.
Closely related to this problem is the problem of CBAs attempting to
commodify non-market based social benefits. In relation to government programs,
Ackerman and Heinzerling have pointed out that:
Cost-benefit analysis tries to mimic a basic function of markets by
setting an economic standard for measuring the success of a
government’s projects and programs. That is, cost-benefit analysis
seeks to perform, for public policy, a calculation that happens
routinely in the private sector. In evaluating a proposed new
initiative, how do we know if it is worth doing? The answer is
much simpler in business than in government.130
The problem they identify leads to two significant concerns. The first is
economic. Assuming that the intangible benefits of a program can be valued, how
is that value determined? The second is moral. Is it appropriate to set a price on
environmental preservation, the extinction of a species, or on human life or health?
In the next sections, I will briefly address both questions.
1. The economic critique
In this section, I re-examine the monetization of difficult-to-monetize benefits.
Here the critique will concern not the ability to monetize, but the method of
monetization. I first want to address what Duncan Kennedy has called the “offerasking problem.”131 I will then discuss the discount rate applied to benefits to be
derived in the future in order to determine their present value.

128. Id. at 1459.
129. Cole, supra note 125, at 59.
130. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1556 (2002).
131. Kennedy, supra note 126 at 401.
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a. The “offer-asking problem”
When there is a difficult-to-monetize problem, economists often solve it by
asking two related questions. First, they might ask individuals what they would
pay to obtain a particular benefit. Second, and alternatively, they might ask
individuals what they would accept in order to give up the same entitlement. As
Kennedy points out, the endowment effect often leads to the same person
answering the two questions very differently.132
A valuation based on such questions is also suspect because of the wealth
effect. If a certain desirable benefit is not mandatorily available for the entire
population, creating values for it based on what a person would pay to obtain it
clearly favors those with greater resources. Kennedy proposes an example of the
competition to obtain the use of a dialysis machine. 133 The wealthy can offer
greater amounts for its use compared to the poor. Therefore, the allocation of such
machines for the use of the wealthy would be efficient but would authorize the
distributers of the machine “to disregard the actual suffering of many poor patients
in favor of the actual money of a few rich ones.”134 This concern will be revisited
in the next section on the moral critique.
Ackerman and Heinzerling use a different example to illustrate a similar point.
They discuss the problem of lead poisoning, which can cause serious
developmental damage in children.135 They cite an economist’s study extrapolating
from what parents pay for a supposed treatment for lead poisoning to a dollar
valuation for each IQ point loss. The study concluded that the then current
standards that sought to protect children from lead hazards “may make little sense”
and that “agencies should consider relaxing their lead standards.”136 Because lowincome families typically deal with the problem of lead contamination and since
those families have limited resources to ameliorate the problem or treat its effects,
using their expenditures to value the benefit of being free from the consequences
of lead paint is unreliable. What they would pay if they had greater resources is
left unexplored and, presumably, deemed irrelevant. It should be clear, however,
that the pre-existing distribution of resources has a great effect on how value is
determined. To quote Kennedy, “[i]t allows the liberal analyst to factor into the
efficiency calculus disutilities of people who quite clearly have neither the property
right nor the income to give those disutilities a ‘social’ weight.”137
132. Id.
133. Id. at 407.
134. Id.
135. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1554 (explaining “[o]ne of the most serious and
disturbing effects of lead contamination is the neurological damage it can cause in young children,
including permanently diminished mental ability. Putting a dollar value on the (avoidable, environmentally
caused) retardation of children is a daunting task but the economic analysts have not been deterred”).
136. Id. at 1555. The authors offer another example concerning the practices of mothers’ car seat
fastening practices. The study examined the time difference between correctly fastening car seats and
mothers’ actual practices. They valued the time difference by using the mothers’ actual or imputed wage
rate, thus valuing the mothers’ valuation of the risks to their children by incorrectly fastening the seats. Id.
at 1555–56.
137. Kennedy, supra note 126, at 407.
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b. Discounting future benefits
For many social benefits, the political sequencing involves considering the
making of a current investment with the goal of reaping benefits in the future. One
can understand environmental regulation, for example, as a currently pertinent
instance of this approach. When benefits (or costs, for that matter) are to be derived
in the future, the monetary value of those benefits must be discounted to bring
them into line with current costs; they must be reduced to present value. One must
identify a time horizon for realizing expected benefits and then monetize them,
before determining how much would one have to invest today in order to receive
the benefit in the future. The discount rate is an interest rate that is used to
determine how much must be invested at the discount rate to be worth the expected
benefit at the time horizon. The higher the discount rate and the longer the time
horizon, the smaller the amount of current investment needed.
Ackerman and Heinzerling provide a simple example. If you had $100 to put
into your savings account today and the bank offered three percent interest on
savings, you would have $103 in one year. In order to obtain $100 in a year at a
three percent discount rate, you would have to deposit only $97.09 today.138 The
problem, of course, is that the benefits sought to be obtained might not have the
monetary associations that savings and interest rates do. Moreover, given the
absence of current investment in significant behavioral change, life on earth is
likely to change dramatically for the worse or, perhaps, end due to environmental
degradation. What is the appropriate discount rate to avoid that prognosis?
It is also important to recognize that the benefits from environmental
regulation (or the provision of additional affordable housing) are not static. They
continue indefinitely into the future and are, let us posit for this example,
fundamental for societal wellbeing. By discounting the benefits, we risk that they
do not exceed the costs, thus thrusting on future generations the harms that we
could have avoided today. This problem seems not to be susceptible to a standard
Cost-Benefit Analysis.
2. The moral critique
This section, which I have headed as “The moral critique,” is really about
several different kinds of problems. At a very basic level, it is about the morality
of reducing matters such as human life and suffering, species extinction, and
environmental degradation to monetary terms. At another level, one might ask the
question of how important equity is in our societal makeup. At yet another level is
the question of how to prioritize incommensurable social goods. Each of these
problems has an impact on the value of CBA.
For decades now, economists have utilized the value of a statistical life (VSL)
to determine damages in tort actions and for plugging into CBAs.139 Proponents
138. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1559.
139. Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & Christopher Woock, The Value of a Statistical Life:
Evidence from Panel Data, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 74, 75 (2012).
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have argued that such a calculation is necessary for efficient outcomes in
regulatory governance and compensatory measurements.140 Others have qualms
about making such a calculation. In one example of such a qualm, Thomas
McGarity quotes Professor Douglas McClean that “[t]o assign . . . exchange value
to such benefits is to treat them as commodities when they should really have a
different kind of value—a sacred value perhaps—and should be regarded as
such.”141
McGarity goes on to question how members of society would react to a study
that concluded the costs of treating handicapped infants with a birth weight of less
than 900 grams exceeded a surviving child’s potential lifetime income as
discounted to present value.142 Taking the example further, what is the value of
treating terminally ill patients? Should we be looking at a CBA to make such
decisions? Many in society might say we should not. Ackerman and Heinzerling
point out that human life is not a commodity despite the implicit meaning
embedded in the idea of the VSL.143 They point out that one cannot buy the right
to kill someone by giving that person the equivalent of the VSL, nor can the holder
of a life sell it. 144 There is, for some, a repugnance to the commodification of
human life.
On the question of equity, I have already argued that in a society in which
people have widely disparate resources, an assessment of the value of a benefit
based on what one would pay to obtain it is a poor proxy for the actual value of
that benefit.145 There are distributional starting points and distributional end points
that make CBAs problematic. As a starting point, people with more resources can
spend more to obtain desired benefits or to avoid undesired costs. The NIMBY
phenomenon, discussed in Part II.B.3, supra, is an illustration of this distributional
effect. Can it be said that the poor are less concerned with the placement of a toxic
dump in their neighborhood than the wealthy? Surely not, yet because the wealthy
have more money to spend to avoid such risks, dumps are disproportionately
placed in poorer neighborhoods. That siting imposes additional harms on an
already distressed segment of society. Looking again to Ackerman and Heinzerling
concerning public policy choices:
There is an important difference between spending state tax
revenues to improve the parks in rich communities and spending
the same revenues to clean up pollution in poor communities. The
value of these two initiatives, measured using cost-benefit
analysis, might be the same in both cases, but this does not mean
that the two policies are equally urgent or desirable.146
140. Id. at 74–75; W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review
of Market Estimates Throughout the World (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9487,
2003).
141. McGarity, supra note 124, at 63.
142. Id.
143. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1564.
144. Id.
145. See discussion supra Part II.A.
146. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1574.
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The question that society is being asked to resolve is how to choose between
incommensurable options. CBA advocates argue, often strenuously, for an
economic analysis.147 Reduce all costs and benefits to monetary terms and there
will be an objective and impartial answer. Of course, for the reasons already
presented, this latter claim is incorrect. There are value judgments in privileging
economic efficiency over other possible social goals. There are also value
judgments in applying dollar amounts to intangible benefits and in making choices
between options that have equal economic feasibility. The idea of political impact
cannot be removed from what are, at least in our society, essentially political
choices.
IV. AFFORDABLE HOUSING, CBA, AND THE CONFLICT OF COMPETING GOODS
In this part, I argue that affordable housing is one of the societal choices about
which CBA should be a secondary (at best) concern. I will also point out why it is
not. Despite the questionable value of using CBA for determining the efficacy of
a policy promoting more affordable housing, I argue that doing so would meet
CBA requirements. I then offer a financing mechanism that would support the
effort.
A. Affordable Housing Should Be a Peremptory Goal of Society
Housing has a central role in our society. It is the hub of our existence and
provides a basis for shelter, comfort, safety, and social life. It is a source of identity
and of wealth. It is a significant factor in our health, well-being, and employment
and educational activities.148 Because of this centrality, decent affordable housing
should be available to all members of society. But it is not. Tens of millions of
people lack such housing and are either homeless, cost burdened, or live in
substandard or over-crowded units.149
The overall budget for the United States is approximately $4.4 trillion.150 To
get an idea of how affordable housing fits into our national policy and budgetary
priorities, the federal government spends approximately $50 billion annually151 for
affordable housing or just over one percent. This is in a nation that is at least eight
million units short of what is needed to adequately and affordably house the
nation’s poorest residents. 152 While this number of units could not, either
physically or financially, be provided all at once, a phased-in process of whittling
down the shortage surely could be undertaken.

147. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018).
148. Diamond & Byrne, supra note 40, at 527.
149. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 2. Aurand’s estimated shortfall is for extremely low-income
households, those below 30% of the Area Median Income (AMI). There is also a shortage of units for very
low-income households (up to 50% of AMI); low-income households (80% of AMI); and workforce
housing (120% of AMI). Id.
150. Budget, CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/topics/budget (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
151. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 47.
152. AURAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
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Harken back to the example offered by Ackerman and Heinzerling about the
dichotomy between providing for the improvement of parks in wealthier
neighborhoods or the clean-up of environmental hazards in poorer ones.153 In their
example, CBA fails to resolve the problem of which to choose assuming only one
could be chosen. Extrapolating from that hypothetical choice, society has made a
series of actual choices that raise similar questions. These run a broad gamut from
tax cuts to border walls, each choice reallocating governmental revenues away
from certain governmental functions and towards others. These choices are
political and in the most benevolent way they could be understood as the outcome
of a conflict of competing goods. Less benevolently, they might be attributed to
public choice, that is, to legislators voting in ways that are most likely to keep them
in office.154 Since contributions to campaigns and, to a great extent, voter turnout
come predominantly from wealthier people and organizations, for most of whom
affordable housing is generally not a priority (and some of whom actually oppose
it),155 one can see why there is a lack of urgency to solve this problem.
B. Affordable Housing Might Pay for Itself
While my fundamental position is that society has an obligation to provide
decent affordable shelter for its low-income households, that position has had little
traction with policy makers over the past half century. Because there is a lack of
moral impetus and political will to provide more affordable housing, I have turned
to a different kind of argument as to why society should provide it—CBA. The
argument is that affordable housing could pay for itself through a combination of
direct savings to government and benefits, both tangible and intangible, to private
interests, some portion of which would be captured by the government through
taxation.
I have already pointed out many of the areas of societal harms that could be,
at least partially, addressed by more affordable housing.156 I offered some idea of
the magnitude of the social loss that is correlated with the absence of sufficient
numbers of affordable housing units.157 Some of the gains are measurable, like the
benefits derived from better health and, to some extent, better education and
through gains in employment and productivity. Others are not as easily measured,
such as an increased sense of well-being, self-esteem, and confidence for newlyhoused individuals.
While there is a strong correlation between the absence of decent affordable
housing and losses in health, education, employment and productivity, and the
increased costs associated with policing, criminal justice, incarceration, and
sanitation, there is not a direct causative link between the absence of housing and
these harms. But to take a page from Cass Sunstein’s playbook, we might assign
some percentage of these harms as being caused by the lack of enough affordable
153. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 130, at 1574.
154. Diamond, supra note 2, at 1008.
155. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
156. See discussion supra Part III.B.
157. See discussion supra Part III.B.

No. 2]

The Costs and Benefits of Affordable Housing

259

housing.158 The eliminated costs and the social gains would recur annually and
would increase as more affordable housing entered the market. Similarly, the
resulting private gains would recur and grow as would the tax revenue as a result
of such gains. The housing, as a durable asset, would remain indefinitely as an
accretion to societal wealth.
C. Financing the Housing
The production of housing is both a time and capital-intensive undertaking.
The size of the affordable housing deficit indicates that vast sums would be needed
to close the gap. Even the federal government is unlikely to be able to finance the
construction or renovation of the necessary units over a short time. Yet government
need not carry the full burden of such a program. As of 2019 there is in excess of
fifteen trillion dollars in mortgage debt outstanding in the United States.159 The
vast bulk of that financing comes from private sources rather than government.
The private market, banks, insurance companies, real estate investment trusts, and
other private institutions are capable of financing significant numbers of affordable
units on an annual basis. What keeps them from doing so is the greater risk
associated with financing affordable housing and the absence of incentivized
developers to produce it. If the government incentivizes the lenders and
developers, there is no economic reason why the housing should not be built.
Developers of housing, as do most other businesses, seek the highest returns
relative to risk. In housing, the risks are higher and the returns are lower for
affordable housing than for market rate housing. Therefore, most developers will
not produce affordable housing.160 As part of a response to that problem, Congress
created the Section 8 Program.161 For the fiscal year 2020, the federal government
has budgeted in excess of thirty billion for rent subsidies under the Housing Choice
Voucher and the Section 8 programs.162 If this amount were increased significantly
and made project-based (meaning the subsidy would remain with the project for a
defined number of years and could be renewed), the economic disincentive of
developers would be largely ameliorated.
Lenders could be incentivized to lend for affordable housing construction and
renovation and for permanent mortgages by an expansion in size and scope of an
already existing set of programs which guarantee to lenders the repayment of
mortgage debt upon the default of mortgage borrowers. As of fiscal year 2017, the
fund that supports the guarantees is about two percent of outstanding insured

158. Cass R. Sunstein, Nonquantifiable 9–12 (June 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2259279).
159. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/mortoutstand/current.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
160. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
161. This program was added to The National Housing Act of 1937 in 1974. See Housing Choice
Voucher Program, Pub. L. No. 93–383, § 201(8), 88 Stat. 633, 662–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f (2012)).
162 . U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF 6 (2020),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/HUD2020BudgetinBrief03072019Final.pdf.
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mortgages.163 Therefore, between an expanded rent subsidy program and mortgage
guaranty program, the government could leverage the benefits to be derived from
the provision of more affordable housing to be built and operated by the private
sector.
This is not to say that there are not problems other than economic ones that
constrain the development of affordable housing. There still needs to be a social
incentive to provide it and to prioritize such investments over other possible uses
of resources. The economic argument has been used, often as a mask for other
objections, to repel demands to produce more housing. What I have tried to do here
is provide a mechanism to help reduce, as much as possible, the economic
argument against producing housing.
V. CONCLUSION
Because there are many social goods that need to be achieved and finite and
inadequate governmental resources available to achieve them, society is
confronted with the conflict of competing goods. When there is not a principled
system for choosing among those goods, choices are made by the exercise of
power, sometimes subtly and sometimes not. The theory presented here is that the
conflict might be avoided when there is a way to make achieving the good
economically resource neutral—to make the benefits derived from providing it
equal the costs of doing so. I hypothesize that would be the case with government
support for producing more affordable housing.

163 . KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FHA SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE INSURANCE:
FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND (MMI FUND) 20 (2018).

